Abstract

This essay discusses the Austrian artist Hermann Nitsch and focuses on his idea of the ‘Orgies Mysteries Theatre.’ We will question the work of Nitsch from three distinct perspectives. What do the concepts of ‘religion,’ ‘ritual,’ and ‘art’ mean in his theoretical and practical œuvre? Do artist and audience play certain roles during the event? Does Nitsch’s current work still hold on to the premise of staging ‘solely real events,’ or has his attempt at ritualism deteriorated into pure spectacle?

at the moment there is a lot of fashionable talk about cult and ritual in art.
(Hermann Nitsch)¹

Few works of art since the mid-twentieth century match those of the Viennese painter and performance artist Hermann Nitsch (born 29 August 1938) in the intensity of the debate on the legitimacy and interpretive problems of the artistic—excessive breaking of taboos that they have ignited. But the uncertainty and outrage that have constituted the reaction to his œuvre were not instigated by his paintings and graphic work,² which have been in the public eye since the end of the fifties. Rather, they were prompted by his performances or ‘actions’ (aktionen) which, under the direction of the artist himself, aim at what he has described as ‘ecstasy’ and ‘instinctual discharge’ (triebdurchbruch)³ for all those participating. In the course of these actions, lamb and ox carcasses are disembowelled and torn apart, and their entrails repeatedly doused by the participants with blood, urine and other fluids. The pivotal works of this genre are the eight ‘discharge of suppressed energy plays’ (abreaktionsspiele) that took place primarily in private spaces, but also in galleries, between 1961 and 1971, as well as the ‘Orgies Mysteries Theatre.’ Nitsch has been performing the O.M. Theatre continuously since 1973 in Schloss Prinzendorf, a castle in Lower Austria that he bought two years earlier.

In this essay we will first turn toward the conceptual grounding Nitsch has developed for these actions and look closely at the problematic implications of
his writings. At the centre of this investigation will be 'religion,' 'ritual,' 'art' and 'theatre,' concepts that are key to his theoretical framework. The concluding part of the essay will use Nitsch's 122nd Action, realized in 2005 at the Burgtheater in Vienna, as a basis to discuss the question of whether and to what extent the Austrian action artist, when putting his theory into practice, still follows his early assumptions and objectives, as he expressed them in relation to the above-mentioned concepts.

Theory and Practice

Numerous essays, manifestos, and lectures published by Nitsch since the 1960s depict his ambition of providing a sound conceptual foundation for the artistic project (as he regards it) of the O.M. Theatre. These publications, presented as 'vitalising' supplements to his actions, confirm him as a representative of the neo-avant-garde who seek to advance their emancipatory agenda both on a practical and theoretical level. It is, however, questionable whether Nitsch's theoretical work fulfils this ambition. One soon realizes the discrepancy between the abundance of his reflections on the one hand and their lack of persuasive power on the other hand. This shortcoming is based not least on Nitsch's inconsistent methodology, which is the result of his critical stance on academia having overshot its target.

In his essay 'Thoughts on the Theory of Actionism and the O.M. Theatre,' for instance, the artist stresses that studying Kant and Husserl shattered his belief in the objectivity of academic inquiry while also arousing his scepticism toward language, and especially toward academic language:

the impossibility of exact definitions became clear to me. there are no static concepts, everything is constantly changing. (...) why can nobody imagine that thinking is also possible outside of the rules of the game of academia.

Such a declaration, which withdraws his own concepts from the (more insinuated than proven) 'dogmatics' of academic argumentation on grounds that they do not seem fitting, is in itself (up to this point) perfectly legitimate. Naturally, however, this declaration does limit the circle of people who can comprehend a theory to those people who 'understand [his] work on their own account,' as Nitsch himself rightly concludes. But this explanation, with which Nitsch postulates his status as an outsider, loses its bindingness at least from the moment he counters the criticism that his 'theory' and 'all [his] work' is 'a miring in the swamp of the irrational' with
the claim that he makes use of "by all means scholarly methods" when producing his conceptions, as his project could not dispense with "systematics and analysis."

Nothing other than a pragmatic understanding of theory, however, which declares all systematics and analysis obsolete, is expressed in his conviction that "when all our theories result in us realizing our work, then that suffices." Against this background it is not surprising that Nitsch at no point in his writings makes an effort toward a differentiating discussion of his theories, nor has he reflected upon their possible falsification. The attempted immunization of his convictions against such falsification is also apparent in the fact that he has completely ignored the current problems and debates within the disciplines relevant for his conceptions (here in particular the disciplines of psychology, religious studies, and the classics). For example, his reconstruction of ancient Dionysiac myths and cults is based exclusively on the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, Erwin Rhode and Walter F. Otto, and therefore on the state of research of the 1930s.

In what follows we will not be able to look in detail at the numerous objections and protests that have long been directed at Nitsch's actions (his publications have never received a similar sort of attention). Rather, by means of an example, we

will investigate from the viewpoint of ritual and performance theory the consequences of the aforementioned gesture of inviolability. The artist defends himself emphatically against accusations that his actions and his writings pursue satanic or blasphemous intentions. Even if he confronts 'all religions critically' (especially in their institutionalized form, in which they 'operate as a political force') his scepticism is not directed toward the essence of religion.

it has always been believed that I get drunk on blasphemy and want to denounce Christianity. In fact Christianity was for me the last religion still alive (...) which still enabled me to enter into the realm of the mythical, making possible for me the vista onto the earliest forms of culture.

Nitsch believes that this view onto the historical development of religious beliefs and practices, also capturing their beginnings, sheds light equally on the psychological state of a people at a given time: 'the history of religions is identical with the history of our psyche.' Looking at them from a functionalist perspective, religions for Nitsch appear to be living expressions of 'world-explanation and coming-to-terms-with-life teachings (welterklärungs- und lebensbewältigungslehren); they 'originate from nature, rise almost vegetatively from our consciousness.' Being 'vegetative' entities, he alleges, they are, however, also subject to the creation, maturation and decay process of everything organic:

like an organism [religions] have a life of their own. they are born, they live and they die, they replace each other. (...) when a religion is too old, has no contemporary force of expression any more, does not correspond to the state of consciousness of its cultural group, a new one starts to bud and after multiple battles asserts itself against the old one.

Probably not by coincidence (but, of course, without mentioning it) Nitsch connects his concept of religion, which emphasizes its organic nature, with the term 'cultural circle' (Kulturkreis). The German ethnologist Leo Frobenius (1873-1931), who introduced the theory of the Kulturkreis, also assumed in his later writings an organic nature of cultures that (like religions in Nitsch's understanding) lived their own lives independent of human influence.

Nitsch's understanding of religion does not only rest on dubious historico-philosophical presumptions but is also problematic for at least two more reasons. First, the statements about the origins and the essence of religion are purely speculative. Second, they completely exclude the reflection and intellectual creativity that are consciously applied to the development and reformation of religions.
The idea of a 'supersession contest among religions' is also the basis for Nitsch's convictions on the transformation of ancient religious motifs into Christian dogma: 'the extreme attitudes to morality of Christianity, the repression of sexuality shifted, transformed dionysian frenzy, the orgiastic into the Christian sacrifice. The dionysian surge turned into the passion.' Reverting to Freud's vocabulary and Nietzsche's motifs, Nitsch not only makes a claim on the status of the artist but also on that of the therapist. The objective of the O.M. Theatre, he claims, is to 'free the repressed dionysian vitality from its prison. I wanted to reach down into the deepest strata of the psyche and reverse the values again (...) I wanted Christ to become Dionysus again.'

The 'primal excess' (\textit{urexzess}) that can be experienced during the dismemberment of animals dissolves discrepancies, Nitsch claims, and destabilizes the 'order crafted' primarily by Christianity, an order in which 'immanence and transcendence, flesh and soul, instinct and intellect, eros and the sacred' are kept in strict opposition. From the convergence of opposites a tension results which 'might be misunderstood as blasphemy. the dramaturgy of my theatre finds in the dissolution of the opposites mentioned a dramatic conflict which is to be resolved.' In the context of this 'dissolution of opposites' in the 'primal excess,' the specifics of religious beliefs and practices ultimately take a backseat. And more than that. By enabling the 'developmental process of the participants in the play,' in which each one of them can 'transcend and experience himself inside of an infinitely and eternally expanding whole,' the negation of specific religious beliefs and practices becomes the necessary condition of the therapeutic effect. Thus Nitsch's actions ultimately turn out to be surrogates of religious practices, which aim for the 'experience' of the 'primal excess,' that in turn could allegedly only be experienced in the ancient Greek religion and could not be comprehended discursively. Nitsch's actions aim for this experience, however, without wanting to bind themselves to the conceptual fundaments of religions in general. The religious guise of the actions, therefore, is mere window-dressing, with which the O.M. Theatre nevertheless cannot dispense.

Ritual as Therapy

The animal dismemberments performed as part of the O.M. Theatre are in Nitsch's view the decisive 'tools' of his therapeutic enterprise. Nitsch refers to the participants in his action rituals (\textit{aktionsrituale}) as 'participants in the play,' but not as actors. In contrast to the execution of a ritual on a theatre stage, which only imitates the ritual's form, the rituals of the O.M. Theatre are supposed to allow
no distance for those involved: 'my theatre stages solely real events. [it stages] rituals which want to sensitize and intensify existence, rituals of sensory perception, which carry us deeper into our existence.' Thus, he claims, his work 'exceeds the entire genre of theatre, it is more than theatre, it is the attempt to contrive a cult for the vitality of existence, for the cosmic event of creation.' The object of every performance is an intensification of perception as a result of excess. This intensification of perception is supposed to embrace all those present. This includes three groups: the surrounding audience, the 'active protagonists,' and the 'passive protagonists.' The 'passive protagonists'—mostly naked, fixed onto wooden rods, robbed of their visual orientation by a blindfold—allow themselves to be covered in torn-out animal entrails and doused in blood by the other participants. While Nitsch, on the one hand, differentiates the 'synaesthetic ritual[s]' of the O.M. Theatre from performed ritual actions on stage, he also, on the other hand, warns against categorizing his rituals as imitations of ancient cult practice:

by no means should my work be confused with a reproduction of ancient cults. cult and ritual forms are part of my form, my artistic language. ritual was and is always a decisive part of all art. my work is a form of cult with respect to life but never a reproduction. at the moment there is a lot of fashionable talk about cult and
ritual in art. one does not need to superimpose ritualistic elements onto art, they are in it as formal means of expression. it is part of art's very own being, to show itself as cult and ritual. the leitmotifs of wagner, monet's cathedrals and haystacks, skrjabin's and georges' art are ritualistic expressions.

These remarks underscore the findings above that Nitsch views rituals as formalized and repetitive sequences of actions which, although they appear in religious guise, can forego a dependency on religious convictions (and therefore are also not limited to the religious sphere). Understood in this way, rituals are defined not by their origins but instead by their repetitive structure, whose sole effect it is to intensify perception. Nitsch's conceptions of religion, ritual, and art converge as the core elements of his action theatre. He understands art 'fundamentally as religious practice, not bound to any denomination.' This freedom, however, goes hand in hand with one of its most noble duties, that is, to be 'cult in respect to life, to creation.' The intention to connect everyday life, religion, art, and ritual, in order to arrive, via 'rituals of life,' at a 'liturgy of life,' represents, as Nitsch has recently put it, the vanishing point of his work: 'the aesthetic ritual of the game should determine the everyday course of life, should spread itself upon it, enter it, and still more: the ritual could dissolve in the intensive festive experience.' With this, the selectivity of the terms 'religion,' 'ritual' and 'art' in Nitsch's conception also dissolves.

The accusations of blasphemy and even Satanism directed at the performances of the O.M. Theatre appear to be, in fact, much less justifiable than the criticism of their pseudo-academic grounding. One would equally be mistaken to prematurely equate Nitsch's action art with political or social actionism, as in its self-understanding this art by no means seeks permanently to overcome religious practices and cultural taboos imprinted by Christianity. When Nitsch in his actions not only makes reference to ancient sacrificial rituals but also takes his inspiration from Christian—and especially Catholic—liturgy, then this is primarily so because he views liturgy as an antitype to a Gesamtkunstwerk appealing to all five senses, which is only truly realized by his O.M. Theatre. He claims to identify in the specific belief in transubstantiation during the Eucharistic Mass 'conduits to action and to the totalizing action theatre.' This is why he does not want to abolish the Mass but merely complement it with the carnal and libidinal elements it apparently has lost—ideally in the form of regularly performed, days-long plays in Prinzendorf. At the same time, Christian liturgy is indispensable to him as an instrument that helps produce the 'experience of the discharge of suppressed energies' (abreaktionserlebnisse).
In accordance with his evolutionary understanding of religion, Nitsch postulates in his theoretical writings a history of culture and consciousness whose primary characteristic is a progressive alienation of man from the 'untamed instinctual realm,' an alienation that reaches its climax in Christianity. Similarly, Nitsch stages a presence within the scope of his Prinzendorf plays which—as he needs them as a negative foil to his transformative actions—ascripts an anachronistically great importance to Christian symbols, liturgical practices and cult objects. The attitude of the O.M. Theatre toward Christianity is at least as much affirmative as it is subversive. Its strategy is first to raise the value of Christianity in its current cultural meaning in order then to accuse it of a 'reality deficit,' which the O.M. Theatre is supposed to remedy.

The 122nd Action at the Burgtheater

Moving beyond these principal findings and focusing on the most recent years, it can be established that Nitsch's theatre and the society it supposedly discredits have moved in ever more convergent directions. Seemingly symptomatic above all of this development is the 122nd Action of the O.M. Theatre, which took place in November 2005 in and around the Vienna Burgtheater. As usual, critics were
strongly divided by the staging, but at the same time it posed a question particularly interesting from a sociological perspective. Should the fact that Nitsch is no longer in a hostile relationship with the Austrian public but instead has been invited into the ‘sacred halls’ of the Burgtheater be interpreted as a sign of social change, maybe even of a resurgence of basic religious needs, or is one perhaps witnessing the final capitulation of an artist to the cultural institutions, an artist who has ultimately sold out of his life’s work and is now allowing it to deteriorate into pure spectacle?

Holding the action up to its theoretical foundation, one is inclined to subscribe to the latter interpretation. What Nitsch presented in Vienna was not only a decidedly toned-down version of his earlier ‘discharge of suppressed energy plays,’ but also must be seen in many ways as a break with his existing aesthetic programme. Whereas the artist, for instance, previously stressed the importance of noise, screaming, and atonality in his work, the staging at the Burgtheater—in collaboration with the Young Philharmonics and the Choir of the University of Vienna and under the direction of the Italian conductor Andrea Cusumano—for the first time employed harmonic progressions. Nitsch by no means wants this to be understood as a betrayal of his ideas or as a concession to the audience, but refers in retrospect to the 122nd Action as a performance ‘without compromise.’

In the turn toward harmonic, ethereal sounds he merely sees a natural maturation in the work of a now more experienced artist. The music now sounded even ‘more corpulent and orgiastic.’

With the shift in musical style he has, however, most likely accommodated the aesthetic sensibilities of the audience as he has probably also done with the decision to show Vroni Schwegler, a former female student of his master class, naked and blindfolded, performing ballet-like exercises on the edge of the stage throughout the entire play. The function of these motion sequences within the O.M. Theatre was not evident, but they were likely a welcome change for those members of the audience who, in the course of the seven and a half hours of the show, were disgusted or simply bored by the actions of the actual participants in the play. Similarly, if one considers the indispensable role that the O.M. Theatre previously assigned to the overwhelming of the audience’s olfactory perception, the increased use in the 122nd Action of pig lungs, which apparently develop less of a smell than bowels, can scarcely be understood as anything but another concession to the audience.
Conclusion

Across the board, Nitsch’s stint at the Burgtheater was marked less by confrontation than by shielding. Just as the halls of the Burgtheater were meticulously covered in plastic film and the carpets in the foyer removed to protect them from defilement with blood, so too did the O.M. Theatre’s first-ever use of live video projections enable the audience to keep a safe distance from the happenings without having to forgo a comfortable view. The whole production was a far cry from immediacy and active experience. The performed actions themselves, however, presented the most drastic deviation. Until the finale, when a few play participants jointly trampled grapes and tomatoes on stage while being doused in bucketloads of blood, there were no ecstatic scenes at all. The greater part of the performance was limited to tableaux vivants that repeatedly employed oversized spears in an overt allusion to the theme of salvation in Wagner’s Parsifal. Thus the erstwhile most important principle of the O.M. Theatre—to banish referentiality from art and replace it with a ‘theatre of real happenings’—was explicitly abandoned.37

Notes

1 NITSCH, Hermann, Zur Theorie des Orgien Mysterien Theaters: Zweiter Versuch, Residenz, Salzburg, 1995, p. 12. In the following text, Nitsch’s exclusive and in German unconventional use of lower case will be maintained when quoting him.
2 Nitsch’s splatter paintings are the result of expressive, ecstatic splattering of paint or blood onto the canvas. In regard to this technique Nitsch views himself in the tradition of informal action painting; at the same time he repeatedly stresses the close connection between this form of painting and his action theatre.
5 NITSCH, idem, p. 159.
6 NITSCH, idem, p. 162.
7 NITSCH, ibidem. He confronts the ‘old-fashioned’ scholarly demand for exactness and objectivity with his ‘neomythological phantasies and attempts at world explanation’ and insists that these phantasies and explanations are also ‘right in their way’ without, however, supporting this claim convincingly. (NITSCH, Zur Theorie des Orgien Mysterien Theaters, p. 5.)
10 NITSCH, idem, p. 148.
11 NITSCH, ibidem. In this context Nitsch makes use of concepts taken from Freud and Jung. He isolates certain elements of these concepts to then synthesize them into his own theory irrespective of their defining specifics (e.g., the critical attitude toward religion that informs Freud’s concepts).
12 NITSCH, idem, p. 151.
13 NITSCH, ibidem.
14 NITSCH, idem, p. 146.
16 NITSCH, idem, p. 147.
17 Thus does Nitsch already in his earliest writings refer to Christianity as a fascinating ‘symptom of a disease’ and ‘collective neurosis’. (NITSCH, idem, p. 147.)
18 NITSCH, ibidem.
19 ‘the primal excess is unreserved surrender to a yes to life (...) it knows no distinction between destruction and construction, lust and pain, death and life, crucifixion and resurrection, and it is nothing but constant impetus for change.’ (NITSCH, Zur Theorie des Orgien Mysterien Theaters, p. 13.)
20 NITSCH, ‘Mein Verhältnis zum Christentum’, p. 149.
23 NITSCH, ibidem.
28 For an informed criticism of such a ‘simple stimulus-response model’ of how ritual works without regard to religious convictions, see ASAD, Talal, ‘The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category’, in ASAD, Talal, Genealogies of Religion:

29 NITSCH, 'ritual als ausdrucksform der kunst, p. 110.

30 NITSCH, idem, p. 112.


32 ‘in the interior space, in the theatre of the church, architecture, sculpture, painting and music brought a gesamtkunstwerk into existence through the drama of the mass. (...) all five senses are affected. the floral decoration of the altars came about for the enrichment of all the visual arts. the scent of flowers and the fume of incense affected the sense of smell. the sacrament of communion affected the sense of taste, the body of the lord was eaten in the form of bread. as a matter of fact, the drama of the mass meets all the demands of modern theatre. nothing is acted, everything actually happens.’ NITSCH, ‘Mein Verhältnis zum Christentum’, p. 155.

33 NITSCH, Hermann, ‘Versuche zur Geschichte der Aktion’ [1971], in: NITSCH, Das Orgien Mysterien Theater, p. 50.

34 NITSCH, ‘Von den Wurzeln der Tragödie’, p.16.


36 NITSCH, idem, p. 11.

37 NITSCH, ‘ritual als ausdrucksform der kunst’, p. 111.